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Abstract:  
3D Virtual worlds are computer mediated environments intended for the users to inhabit and interact 
via their representational avatars. Trading virtual goods in 3D virtual worlds plays an important role 
in realizing the virtual economy. This essay examines the impact of the unique virtual goods 
permission settings (Copy, Modify, and transfer) on creators’ pricing strategies. We collect data of 
virtual items from the Second Life marketplace XStreet to explore the factors that affect virtual goods 
prices. We use ANOVA to test the relationship between each permission and price, and conduct 
random effects model to investigate how permissions affect price in different categories. Our 
empirical results show that “Copy” permission, which might be regarded to reduce the profit of the 
creators, has a positive effect in virtual goods pricing strategies. Virtual items are more likely to be 
assigned “Copy” which seems to give additional duplicates for free. Furthermore, prices of virtual 
goods with “Copy” permission are higher than those without, and the more copies a consumer wants, 
the higher the price difference between the items with “Copy” and those without “Copy” permission. 
The effects of other issues on virtual goods prices are analyzed and managerial implications are 
discussed. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Virtual worlds are computer-simulated 3D platforms intended for its users to inhabit and interact via 
avatars represented by their 3D graphical humanoids1. Virtual worlds enable the users to act as if they 
were “physically” living in a real-world community, and are characterized as real-time actions, 
distance communication, and real-world rules on user interaction. Originated from early stage massive 
multiplayer online games, virtual worlds have evolved into comprehensive platforms for diverse 
applications, such as collaborative educating and training centers, online social communities, and 
open-trading business environment. Plenty of studies and technology statements (Bridges et al. 2007; 
Fetscherin and Lattemann 2007) have addressed that the development of virtual world industry is on a 
path of dynamic growth and innovation.  
With the rapid development of virtual world industry in the past a few years, trading of virtual goods 
and service has played a significant role in contributing to the virtual economy (Castronova 2002). 
Users not only consume the virtual products or services in world, they themselves build up the 
economy of the virtual world. The virtual items collected are effective in preventing users from 
switching into another world (Shapiro and Varian 1999). Virtual goods, either for sale, or as a new 
form of in-world advertisement as well as other purposes, have been stated as a new business model 
in our life2. Some virtual goods in a virtual world bear similar utilities of real products in real world, 
which enables virtual world users to feel like living within the world and consuming the virtual goods. 
For example, virtual avatars make up themselves to attend social activities; they furnish virtual home 
to accommodate their friends; they play with virtual balls for entertainment. A latest activity of free 
Michael Jackson glove virtual gift3 shows the potential of virtual goods for generating social media. 
Revenue of virtual world industry has achieved $2.2 billion in 2006 and is forecasted to be $5.9 
billion in 20124. One of the most prosperous virtual worlds, Habbo Hotel, has brought $70 million 
revenue, of which virtual goods sales make up 85%5. It is estimated that the total trading of virtual 
goods in virtual worlds (including Second Life, Tencent, Gaia Online, Habbo Hotel, and hi5) is at 
about 1.5 billion euro in the recent years (Kappe 2009).  
Among the most popular virtual worlds, Second Life 6  has gained a lot of attention from both 
academia and industry since its first millionaire Anshe Chung was reported on Business Week7. It is 
an Internet-based 3D virtual world where users can network, participate in various activities, and 
create and trade virtual goods with each other. It is a successful example of user-generated virtual 
world, which has shown its potentials for cross-selling of real world business, animated advertisement, 
etc (Ondrejka 2007). Creators of virtual goods in Second Life can sell their creations for Linden 
dollars, which is exchangeable for real currencies such as U.S. dollars. Second Life’s free-trading 
mode provides the users a motivating channel to make profit in virtual world. According to Second 
Life statistics8, Second Life economy (user-to-user transaction) totals $567 million US dollars in 2009, 
i.e. 65% growth over 2008; Sales of user generated virtual items on XStreet SL9, reaches L$1.6 billion 
or US$6.1 million, growth of 74% over 2008. Second Life’s prosperity of virtual economy verifies 
that virtual goods trade is no longer a phenomenon of entertainment on the Internet. However, it 
becomes an interesting business model worth investigating for both researchers and practitioners.                                                        
It is interesting that the creator of a virtual good in Second Life can assign permission rights such as 
“Copy”, “Modify” or “Resell/give away (Transfer)” to the next owner. They are not ordinal or nested 
                                                            
1
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_world  
2
 http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/06/20/virtual-goods-the-next-big-business-model/ 
3
 http://www.insidefacebook.com/2009/07/07/michael-jackson-breaks-several-facebook-records-during-memorial-service/ 
4
 http://gigaom.com/2007/05/03/virtual-world-revenues-6-billion-by-2012/ 
5
 http://www.virtualgoodsnews.com/2009/03/virtual-goods-make-up-85-of-habbo-revenue-ads-and-new-products-to-
grow.html 
6
 http://secondlife.com  
7
 http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2006/11/second_lifes_fi.html 
8
 https://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2010/01/19/2009-end-of-year-second-life-economy-wrap-up-
including-q4-economy-in-detail 
9
 https://www.xstreetsl.com/modules.php?name=Marketplace, a website that lists all the virtual items or services for sale on 
Second Life. 
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 to each other. Creators can assign one of several permissions at the same time or assign no permission 
at all. Thus there are eight possible permission settings that could be assigned to a virtual creation 
when it is on the virtual goods market: “Copy”, “Modify”, “Transfer”, “Copy, Modify”, “Copy, 
Transfer”, “Modify, Transfer”, “Copy, Modify, Transfer”, or “No permission”. For example, the next 
owner of a virtual dress with “Modify” permission can change the color or size according to his 
preference, but he cannot make additional copies or resell this virtual dress in the virtual goods market. 
If the dress is assigned “Copy, Transfer”, he has the permission to make many copies as he wants and 
to resell these items to others or send them for free. 
Some permission settings in other virtual worlds are subject to price discrimination by limiting the 
period of usage, i.e. buyers would have different time period of usage of the virtual item at the cost of 
the corresponding price. This type of permission could be set by the seller (Neopia sellers assign a 
permission right on a virtual item and charge a fixed price), or be chosen by the buyers (sellers of 
Tencent QQ, 9 you, and There provide several permission-price options for buyers to decide how 
much they would like to pay for using the virtual item within a particular time period). These 
examples of virtual goods trading lack interaction among end users, and prices of virtual goods are not 
negotiable (Castronova 2001).  
However, when purchasing a physical good in real life, consumers do not limit themselves to thinking 
about its duration (like the period of usage of a virtual good); they instead take into account how 
much quantity they want, whether the size or color is favorable, whether its quality keeps as original 
when sent away as a gift, etc. Thus, the unique form of virtual good permissions rights COPY, 
MODIFY, and TRANSFER in Second Life distinctly implies the real world consuming pattern. 
Moreover, as virtual goods’ utility in Second Life matches their archetypes in real world, users’ 
demand for virtual goods follows the demand theory of physical goods in real world economy. That is, 
the possibility of using multiple copies of the identical goods simultaneously increase a consumer’s 
utility in the virtual world, as in the real world. To be specific, a consumer in real life might be in 
need of duplicate chairs to furnish his/her house; he/she might like the pant to be shorter than original 
design; or he/she might simply want to send a gift to his/her friends. It is normal that in the real world 
consumers would not get duplicate goods for free due to the manufacturing cost of real products. 
However, in Second Life, the COPY permission enables the buyers to possess duplicate copies by 
purchasing only a single item of virtual good. Therefore, the economic property of demand 
aggregation of virtual goods intrigues us to study the virtual goods pricing strategies in consideration 
of their permission rights and from the perspective of users’ demand in Second Life.  
In this paper we aim to examine the pricing strategies and permission settings of virtual goods on the 
marketplace of Second Life. Copy, Modify and Transfer are unique terms of permission rights in 
Second Life, and we are eager to know whether and how each of them plays a role in virtual goods 
pricing strategies. Thus the research questions of this paper are: To deploy the optimal pricing and 
permission strategies to maximize the profit, whether there is any relationship between price and 
permissions? Furthermore, we are examining what other factors would affect virtual goods prices. 
The following sections are organized as below: Section 2 is an overview of related research in terms 
of pricing strategies. We present the theoretical framework based on which the empirical estimations 
are carried out. Section 3 is the data description we collected from XStreet. Section 4 provides the 
empirical analysis of the impact of permission rights on the virtual goods pricing strategies. Section 5 
is the managerial implications of our empirical results, the limitations of this paper, and directions of 
future research. 
2. PRIOR RESEARCH 
As a special form of digital goods, virtual goods share the same cost structure with digital information 
goods, i.e. substantial production cost vs. negligible marginal cost. For example, free trial of software 
has some similarity of virtual goods with COPY permission; the degraded pirate is modified product 
of original version; online sharing of music and open source software have the characteristics of 
sending away virtual goods for free, which is permitted by TRASFER permission. Thus pricing 
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 strategies of information goods leave some insights on virtual goods pricing. In this section we will 
refer to some previous literature of information goods versioning, piracy and online sharing.  
Versioning is the strategy that assigns the information goods with several quality levels to satisfy the 
demand of different consumers. It has been studied from the perspectives of pricing structures, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare (Varian 1997, Shapiro and Varian 1998, Bhargava and 
Choudhary 2008). Bhargava and Choudhary (2008) identify the conditions under which versioning is 
optimal. Other studies on versioning have also considered the impact of network externality on 
information goods pricing. A common business strategy to promote product adoption in software 
industry is to provide a free trial version with limited functionalities of the commercial product to 
increase the installed user base. The positive presence of network externality makes free trials very 
appealing as it increases user base, which can lead to increased profit for the seller (Conner 1995, 
Cheng and Tang 2007, Cheng and Liu 2008).  
Research on versioning information goods and free trials of software mainly focuses on quality 
differentiation of the digital good. However, our research focuses on the digital goods of the same 
quality considering permission rights in Second Life. The same item of virtual good with different 
permissions could be regarded as virtual goods in different versions with the same quality. So the free 
trials of software could be a reference to the copy permission to virtual goods. Versioning information 
goods especially free trials of software have been accepted as useful marketing strategies, which could 
be a reference to virtual goods permission strategies. 
Literature that looks at the impact of piracy (illegal copying and sharing of information goods) 
discusses the situations of duplicating information goods of the same quality as the original, as well as 
copied goods of inferior quality. The possible additional quantities of information goods made 
through illegal copying (pirating) can alter seller profitability and social welfare considerably. 
Belleflamme (2002) points out copying information goods may increase social surplus, but at the 
expense of the producer’s profits. Some empirical research, however, have shown that sharing tends 
to have a demand aggregation effect which decreases buyer diversity (Bakos et al. 1999). Pirating of 
information goods can, therefore, actually increase seller profitability (Bakos et al. 1999, Varian 2000, 
Chellappa and Shivendu 2005).  Online sharing of music (Bhattacharjee et al. 2006; Gopal et al. 2006) 
and open source software (Raghu et al. 2009), which might have been regarded as a reason for losing 
profit, do not necessarily hurt the sellers.  
Several researchers have examined the impact of allowing (or restricting) the copying of information 
goods in the general framework of digital rights management. Through an analytical model 
characterizing the choice of digital rights by a firm that also offers a physical version of the 
information good (such as a regular printed version of a book and an eBook) with empirical testing 
using data from the eBook industry, Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan (2006) find that the copying 
rights enable a seller to raise prices only when they can enhance the digital experience associated with 
purchasing an eBook. For example, the ability to copy relevant parts from an eBook to one’s 
document adds utility to a consumer.  
The theoretical and empirical results of digital goods pricing provide insight for virtual goods pricing 
strategies. Piracy and online sharing are illegal but might be stimulating sales for the sellers. However, 
the permissions of virtual goods are additional power for the creators to allocate and exchange virtual 
goods in the virtual worlds. Thus it is worth investigating how virtual goods creators apply their 
permission and corresponding pricing strategies in virtual worlds. 
Besides digital goods pricing strategies, Ba et al. (2009) develop a multi-period economic model to 
examine under what conditions the COPY permission leads to the highest profit for the creator of a 
virtual good. In our paper, we test some results of Ba et al. (2009)’s paper and explore the underneath 
factor that affects virtual goods pricing strategies. Permissions of virtual goods, especially Copy, 
allow the consumers to have free duplicates which seems to shrink sellers’ market share and 
meanwhile induce more transactions in the virtual world. In this paper we want to explore virtual 
goods sellers’ pricing and permissions strategies based on the empirical analysis of data from Second 
Life Xstreet. 
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 3. RESEARCH METHODS 
We collect data of virtual good items from XStreet SL marketplace. There are over two million items 
of virtual goods ever been created for sale on XStreet SL, and we collect creations that have been 
purchased by June 2009. Since only those who have purchased can vote for their virtual item, we get 
purchased items by deleting the data with no record of votes from online collections. There are 
altogether 16 categories, which are animals, animations, apparel, art, avatar accessories, avatar 
appearance, building components, business, celebrations, gadgets, home and garden, miscellaneous, 
recreation and entertainment, scripts, vehicles, and weapons. For each category, we generate a sample 
of 200 IDs among the items that have been voted with Excel Analysis ToolPak add-in, and then 
extract detailed information for each item on the item webpage from XStreet SL using 
HappyHarvester. We clean the data by deleting the items with missing values such as the creator’s 
total production and the number of votes. We finally get a data set of 2606 items for data analysis.  
The information for each item includes item ID, item name, whether it is a featured item (a featured 
item is an advertisement offered by XStreet SL), number of images, creator’s name, quantity of the 
creator’s total creations, category ID, category name, permissions (COPY, MODIFY, TRANSFER), 
price, number of comments, number of discussions, number of votes, and average ratings. Table 1 is 
the summary statistics for the numerical variables. In the multivariate analysis, we find that the 
number of reviews and the number of votes are positively correlated (0.7967), and the number of 
reviews and number of discussions are slightly correlated (0.3165). 
  
Variables  Descriptions Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Images Number of images 1.58 1.37 1 1 5 
Creator’s Tol Creator’s total production 207.28 344.72 1 93 3438 
Price  Virtual good price 151.33 114.51 3 100 600 
Reviews Number of reviews 0.43 1.48 0 0 33 
Discussions Number of discussions  0.14 0.02 0 0 24 
Rating Average rating by buyers 4.24 0.64 1 4.4 5 
Votes Number of votes 11.57 22.36 3 6 547 
          Table 1: Summary statistics for the numerical variables 
To investigate the impact of each permission on price, we transform permissions to be three dummy 
variables to indicate whether or not COPY, MODIFY or TRANSFER is assigned to a virtual item 
respectively, i.e. Copy=1 when COPY is assigned, and 0 vice versa. Among the collected items, 56% 
have COPY permission, 55% with MODIFY permission and 49% with TRANSFER. This means the 
virtual goods creators are more likely to assign COPY permission on the creations. Among all 
categories, building components have the highest probability of being assigned COPY, accounting for 
88%. The most common permission and their combinations assigned to the virtual items are “Copy”, 
“Copy & Modify”, “Transfer”, and “Modify & Transfer”. Table 2 is the incidences of whether each 
permission is assigned by category, including assigned with other permissions.  
 
Category Total 
items 
# and % of 
copy assigned 
# and % of 
modify assigned 
# and % of 
transfer assigned 
Animals 158 51 32% 69 44% 91 58% 
Animations 168 51 30% 112 67% 105 63% 
Apparel 198 109 55% 130 66% 84 42% 
Art 138 39 28% 95 69% 78 57% 
Avatar Accessories 181 90 50% 130 72% 73 40% 
Avatar Appearance 153 89 58% 71 46% 47 31% 
Building Components 173 153 88% 159 92% 129 75% 
Business 162 115 71% 105 65% 83 51% 
Celebrations 168 50 30% 84 50% 112 67% 
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 Gadgets 152 81 53% 68 45% 54 36% 
Home and Garden 192 114 59% 69 36% 78 41% 
Miscellaneous 135 44 33% 57 42% 90 67% 
Recreation & Entertainment 171 66 39% 69 40% 84 49% 
Scripts 178 156 88% 92 52% 117 66% 
Vehicles 148 122 82% 70 47% 37 25% 
Weapons 131 102 78% 58 44% 20 15% 
Grand Total 2606 1432 55% 1438 55% 1282 49% 
                   Table 2: Incidences and percentage of permission rights by category 
4. ANALYSIS 
The demand of different virtual goods differs as consumers need various quantities of virtual goods 
for different categories, as far as COPY permission is concerned (Ba et al. 2009). This coincides with 
real life experience that people need duplicate in-door chairs and decoration units to serve friends, but 
they want unique appearance to distinguish themselves from others. Consumers also consider whether 
they want to keep the virtual item for everyday use or transfer it after one time virtual experience. So 
before we analyze the relationship between price and permissions, we first test whether virtual goods 
permissions and prices differ in category. 
We apply a Log transformation on price as the distribution of the dependent variable Price is very 
skewed. LogPrice satisfies the normality and constant variance assumptions of statistical analysis, 
thus we use LogPrice in the following the Welch ANOVA, the random effects regression model, etc. 
We use contingency analysis (Simpson 1951) to count the incidence of each permission assigned or 
not, and apply Pearson's chi-square test to test whether each permission is contingent on category. To 
test whether prices are significantly different in each category, we apply the Welch ANOVA to test if 
the variance of price in each category equals and then to compare the equality of means of prices for 
each category.  
The results in table 3 show that permissions are contingent on virtual good category. In other words, 
creators’ decisions on whether to assign COPY on virtual goods differ in category. So do modify and 
transfer. The result of Welch ANOVA test (at the alpha level 0.05) shows that variances of price in 
each category are unequal and prices differ in category.  
(P-value) Copy Modify Transfer LogPrice 
Pearson’s chi-square test Welch ANOVA Test 
Category 451.66 234.636 262.849 F = 11.5518 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
           Table 3: Contingency Test of permissions and price over category 
Our data supports that both permissions and prices differ in categories. That is, as for different 
categories, virtual goods creators apply different pricing and permission strategies to their creations. 
To solve the research question, we will test how each permission affects virtual goods prices next. 
4.1 Whether permissions affect price  
We propose that COPY, MODIFY and TRANSFER plays a significant role in virtual goods prices 
respectively. Thus, we hypothesize that prices differ in whether each of the permission is assigned:  
Hypothesis 1a: Virtual goods prices significantly differ in whether COPY is assigned or not.  
Hypothesis 1b: Virtual goods prices significantly differ in whether MODIFY is assigned or not.  
Hypothesis 1c: Virtual goods prices significantly differ in whether TRANSFER is assigned or not. 
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 We conduct Student’s t–Test to compare the means of virtual goods’ price with COPY permission and 
those prices without COPY, given that these two groups have different variances of price. We apply 
the same test to compare the means of price with the impact of MODIFY/TRANSFER or not. Table 4 
illustrates the results of the comparison of prices regarding each permission is assigned or not 
respectively. Our findings support that items with COPY permission are charged higher than those 
without. But we found that there is no significant difference between prices of with MODIFY and No 
MODIFY situation. There is no significant difference between TRANSFER and no transfer strategies 
either. Thus, virtual goods prices in Second Life differ in whether COPY is assigned, but are 
independent of MODIFY and TRANSFER permission. It is consistent with the virtual goods property 
that with COPY permission, the consumers get more utility by consuming multiple copies 
simultaneously; however, MODIFY or TRANSFER permissions may increase consumer’s incentive 
to purchase but do not affect virtual goods’ utility as COPY permission does. 
 
Welch’s t-Test to compare the mean of LogPrice with each permission assigned or not 
  No Copy Copy    No Modify Modify 
 
  No Transfer Transfer 
Mean 4.563743 4.719116  Mean 4.61848 4.674008  Mean 4.663872 4.633886 
Var. 0.904934 0.926321  Var. 1.157047 0.730943  Var. 1.052859 0.78775 
Items 1174 1432  Items 1168 1438  Items  1324 1282 
H0: Pc=Pnc  H0: Pm=Pnm  H0: Pt=Pnt  
df 2516  df 2201  df 2572 
t Stat 
-4.12652  t Stat -1.43426  t Stat 0.798658 
P(T<=t) one-tail <0.0001  P(T<=t) one-tail 0.07582  P(T<=t) one-tail 0.212281 
t Critical one-tail 1.645459  t Critical one-tail 1.645546  t Critical one-tail 1.645446 
P(T<=t) two-tail <0.0001  P(T<=t) two-tail 0.151641  P(T<=t) two-tail 0.424562 
t Critical two-tail 1.960907   t Critical two-tail 1.961042   t Critical two-tail 1.960887 
Table 4: Student's t-Test for price difference based on permissions 
The empirical analysis has supported that prices of virtual goods differ in category, and that prices are 
dependent on COPY permission. We further examine whether this impact of permission COPY on 
prices differs in categories. According to Ba et al. (2009)’s model, “Prices and profits associated with 
a COPY strategy approach the ones from a NO COPY strategy when typical consumers want very 
few copies of an item.” Thus we propose that:  
Hypothesis 2: The impact of COPY permission on prices differs in categories. To be specific, the more 
copies a consumer wants for the virtual goods, the higher the price difference between the COPY and 
NO COPY strategies. 
 
Category Two-tail F ratio P-value 
Animals  0.6344 0.4270 
Animations  0.0176 0.8945 
Apparel  0.0223 0.8813 
Art  0.1412 0.7077 
Avatar accessories  0.2729 0.6020 
Avatar appearance 0.6185 04328 
Building components 12.2467 0.0006* 
Business  1.5832 0.2101 
Celebrations  0.0984 0.7542 
Gadgets  2.3826 0.1248 
Home and garden 361.4063 0.0001* 
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 Miscellaneous  2.0684 0.1527 
Recreations & entertainment 1.8169 0.1795 
Scripts  0.0905 0.7639 
Vehicles  0.0446 0.8331 
Weapons  0.3168 0.5745 
            Table 5: Welch ANOVA test of LogPrices with COPY or not by category 
We apply student’s t-Test to compare the means of prices with COPY or not in each category, and to 
test hypothesis 2 that whether COPY in each category has different effects in price. Table 5 is the 
summary of the student’s t-Test. 
Our results in table 5 show that prices in categories building components and home and garden are 
significant different between COPY and No COPY strategy. In these two categories, virtual goods 
prices with COPY permission are higher than those without. Other categories of virtual items have not 
shown such significant difference in their prices with COPY permission or not. This result intuitively 
matches our understanding of the demand for virtual goods. In Second Life, when an avatar builds up 
his/her home, he/she may want a few copies of chairs in the room; he/she may also need some 
textures to furnish his virtual house. This kind of demand for multiple virtual goods applies in 
categories building components and home and garden. But for other categories of virtual goods, 
consumers normally would not demand duplicate copies of a single item, so the prices with COPY or 
not do not differ significantly. Since building components and home and garden are the two 
categories in which users most possibly demand copies of virtual goods, the significant difference in 
price with COPY or not in these two categories verifies hypothesis 2. These results are consistent with 
Ba et al. (2009)’s model as well. 
4.2 Which factors impact price 
To further investigate which factors would impact virtual goods pricing strategies, we conduct a linear 
regression model with all possible independent variables. Since there are eight possible permission 
settings for a virtual item, and applying two of them may have different effect on price, e.g., the seller 
will be afraid to lose the whole market if Copy and Transfer are assigned together. Thus we add the 
interaction effect of COPY, MODIFY, and TRANSFER into the model to test whether any 
combination of permissions would be significantly impacting prices. For example, Copy*Modify 
indicates whether COPY and MODIFY are assigned together. Table 6 is the description of non-
continuous variables and some of their interaction effects. The continuous variables in the model have 
been described in table 1.  
Binary variables  Indication of the variable  
Copy =1 When COPY is assigned, =0 vice versa. 
Modify =1 When MODIFY is assigned, =0 vice versa. 
Transfer =1 When TRANSFER is assigned, =0 vice versa. 
Copy*Modify =1 When COPY and MODIFY are both assigned, =0 otherwise. 
Copy*Transfer =1 When COPY and TRANSFER are both assigned, =0 otherwise. 
Modify*Transfer =1 When MODIFY and TRANSFER are both assigned, =0 otherwise. 
Copy*Modify*Transfer =1 When full permissions are assigned, =0 otherwise. 
IfFeatured =1 when an item is a feature item, =0 vice versa. 
Table 6: Descriptions of binary variables in the model 
We add the cross effect of Rating and Votes in the model (1), in that their intersection implies the 
evaluation by purchasers and the popularity of the virtual item meanwhile. Thus Rating*Votes as 
multiplied regressors are more convincing than buyer’s average rating or the number of buyer’s votes 
alone. In table 3 we have verified that prices differ in category, and then we examine virtual goods 
category’s further impact on prices to in the regression model, eg., whether virtual goods in one 
851
 category has higher or lower average prices than other items on the marketplace. We take virtual 
goods category as a random effect (Long 1997) in the regression model (1). We have tested in the 
multivariate analysis on the continuous variables that the number of reviews is positively correlated 
the number of votes, and slightly correlated with number of discussions as well. To avoid 
multicollinearity, we do not use the number of reviews as an independent variable in the random 
effects regression model (1).  
, , ,i j i i j i jLogPrice Xµ α β εΤ= + + ⋅ +                                                                                      (1) 
In model (1), i is the index of category, and in our analysis i=1, 2,... , 16.  j is the index of virtual 
items, thus j=1, 2, ... , Ni, when an items belongs to category i. Ni is the count of items in category i in 
the dataset. µ  is the average intercept in the regression model of LogPrice. iα  is the random effect of 
price in category i . 
,i jε  is the residuals of regression model. 
,
,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
( , , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , , )
( , , , , , , , , , , ,
i j
i j
X Copy Modify Transfer Copy Modify Copy Transfer
Modify Transfer Copy Modify Transfer IfFeatured Images
CreatorTol Discussions Rating Votes Rating Votes
β β β β β β β β β β β β β
Τ
= ⋅ ⋅
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⋅
= 12 13 14, , )β β Τ
        
Table 7 shows the estimates and significance for the fixed effects. The R square of the linear 
regression model with random effects is 0.0986. The t Ratio and p-value for each parameter estimates 
of the model indicate that COPY plays a significant role in pricing strategy. The significant 
permissions impacting prices are COPY, TRANSFER, and the interaction effect of COPY/MODIFY, 
and COPY/TRANSFER.  Other significant factors in the random effects model are IfFeatured, 
Creator’s total production, Votes and its intersection with Rating.  
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 4.2816264 0.195685 21.88 <.0001 
Copy 0.080644 0.029282 2.75 0.0059* 
Modify 0.039073 0.027463 1.42 0.1549 
Transfer 0.05854 0.02834 2.07 0.0390* 
Copy*modify -0.054444 0.027426 -1.99 0.0472* 
Copy*transfer -0.106127 0.0287 -3.70 0.0002* 
Modify*transfer -0.026763 0.027329 -0.98 0.3275 
Copy*modify*transfer -0.047183 0.027121 -1.74 0.0820 
IfFeatured 0.325679 0.124854 2.61 0.0091* 
Image -0.006475 0.013308 -0.49 0.6266 
Creator's total production -0.000122 5.556e-5 -2.20 0.0278* 
Discussions 0.0417732 0.021554 1.94 0.0527 
Rating 0.1512483 0.032261 4.69 <.0001* 
Votes 0.0004615 0.000902 0.51 0.6090 
Rating*Votes 0.0090579 0.002591 3.50 0.0005* 
 Table 7: Estimates of fixed effects and their significance in the regression model 
Permission settings COPY, TRANSFER, and permission combinations Copy/Modify, Copy/Transfer 
are significantly impacting virtual goods pricing strategies. Thus COPY is a pivotal issue in virtual 
goods pricing strategies, in that not only COPY permission itself has an incremental effect in virtual 
good prices as we tested in hypothesis 1a , but also its permission combinations with MODIFY or 
TRANSFER are significant factors. COPY permission brings an item aggregation utility. This affects 
the demand of virtual items and become a hint how to obtain pricing strategies. Prices with COPY 
permission are higher than those of No COPY, which coincides with the intuition that when 
consumers do not want the item for many quantities, prices associated with a COPY strategy are close 
to the ones from a No COPY strategy. If consumers want many quantities of an item like chairs, the 
prices with COPY are significantly higher than those with No COPY. TRANSFER, instead, increase 
the users’ willingness to purchase a virtual item, as TRANSFER enables the next owner to resell or 
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 give the item away flexibly without any quality depreciation if he/she does not feel like it. Thus it is 
reasonable that items with TRANSFER permission are charged significantly higher than those with no 
transfer permission. The combination of COPY and TRANSFER has a significant negative interaction 
effect. Creators may be afraid that the next owner will be able to resell the creation with many 
duplicates. The percentage of incidence shows that assigning copy and transfer together is not a 
common permission setting (no more than 2%). COPY/MODIFY has a negative interaction effect. 
But since both COPY and MODIFY have positive effects, their combination effect is still positive.  
Whether the item is featured and the creator’s total production are both significant factors in virtual 
goods pricing strategies. The importance of featured items shows that in-world advertising and 
information dissemination is helpful to impress consumers and market the creations (Berthon et al. 
1996). Featured items are charged higher than non-featured items. The virtual good creators pay for 
their creations to be featured on the marketplace, and in turn they will benefit from this Internet-based 
advertisement. However, the creators with more production charge lower prices for their creations. 
The more production they have, the more possibility they could copy, modify and transfer virtual 
items and thus lower the cost of creating new items. It could also be explained by the theorem of 
economies of scale in real world manufacturing industry (Krugman 1980). Rating and its intersection 
with number of votes are both positive factors of pricing virtual goods. This verifies that an 
influencing factor in 2D Internet marketing (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), word of mouth, is yet 
working in 3D virtual goods marketplace. 
The random effects model predicts the categories that have different mean of prices than average as 
well. Table 8 is the predictions of random effects for each category. 
Category BLUP Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Animals 0.0866935 0.087096 1.00 0.3237 
Animations -0.082852 0.086294 -0.96 0.3411 
Apparel 0.3059566 0.082895 3.69 0.0005* 
Art -0.327114 0.090561 -3.61 0.0006* 
Avatar Accessories 0.149193 0.084511 1.77 0.0832 
Avatar Appearance 0.0266631 0.087683 0.30 0.7621 
Building Components 0.1950697 0.092315 2.11 0.0385* 
Business -0.150214 0.087143 -1.72 0.0901 
Celebrations -0.183434 0.085986 -2.13 0.0373* 
Gadgets 0.0908009 0.08772 1.04 0.3049 
Home and Garden 0.2150929 0.084809 2.54 0.0141* 
Miscellaneous -0.425449 0.090627 -4.69 <.0001* 
Recreation and Entertainment 0.1431397 0.085288 1.68 0.0990 
Scripts -0.13289 0.089417 -1.49 0.1425 
Vehicles -0.079144 0.089422 -0.89 0.3796 
Weapons 0.1684884 0.091852 1.83 0.0713 
     Table 8: Predictions of random effects generated by each category 
The categories with significant different prices are apparel, art, building components, celebrations, 
home and garden, and miscellaneous. According to the sign of BLUP (best linear unbiased predictor) 
of the random effects, apparel, building components, and home and garden charge higher prices than 
average, whereas art, celebrations, and miscellaneous are cheaper in general. In categories like home 
and garden and building components, the items are complicated to create, i.e. more prims (the 3D 
single parts in-world) are needed to assemble such virtual items. Thus they are relatively more 
expensive than other items such as decorating gifts in celebrations category. However, virtual items 
like art, are created not only for sale, but also as an exhibition to potential users. Thus the creators 
would not charge high for these items.  
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the relationship between virtual good pricing and permission strategies. The 
virtual good permissions on Second Life are not random rules, but instead strategic settings in a user-
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 generated virtual world. Virtual good permissions in Second Life become a leverage of selling virtual 
items. Based on real data analysi, most items are assigned COPY permission. The permission COPY, 
used to be regarded as a risk of losing market share, proves to be a significant factor that impact 
pricing strategies. The results of our data analysis are consistent with Ba et al. (2009)’s economic 
model of virtual goods pricing strategies in Second Life that investigates when to assign COPY 
permission to virtual items. Both permission settings and price strategies vary in different categories, 
as consumers’ demand shape for virtual goods are similar within one particular category but are 
distinguished over different categories.  
From a seller’s perspective, a new seller would have no idea of consumer behavior and demand of 
virtual goods. Under this scenario of imperfect information on market, it is suggested he assign a 
higher price with copy permission at the beginning. As he becomes familiar to the virtual good market, 
he should lower the price of his creation and change permission rights according to his knowledge 
about consumer’s demand for the item. This is compatible to the empirical result of information goods 
pricing in the presence of piracy (Chen and Png 2003). 
As for a new player who wants to purchase some virtual items, it is better to look into those with 
transfer permission so that he can resell it if he feels not like it. In a long term, if a virtual item is 
necessary in virtual life, transfer permission becomes not so important because the used item would 
not be a good sale when it is out of fashion. Nevertheless, copy permission turns to be more critical as 
avatars have clear idea how much quantity he wants for a kind of virtual item after exploring virtual 
world for a while. And this issue in turn is the key issue to assign copy permission with perfect 
information on market. 
This paper has its limitation. As for the data, since Second Life virtual goods trading are still new 
phenomenon within the past years, a lot of sellers are still exploring the virtual world without 
guidance. We can see from the XStreet data, a large proportion of virtual items have never been paid 
attention, i.e. with no incidence of buyers’ votes. There are quite a few missing values for some items. 
We look forward to more complete data when virtual goods market in the future.  
There are quite a few directions for future research within the area of virtual goods trading. We are 
staying in the stage of studying permissions of virtual goods on SL, which is a unique permission 
setting mode from other virtual worlds. Having optimal permissions and pricing strategies, we could 
think of predicting virtual good sales revenue as well. Current virtual world consulting corporations 
have summarized the virtual worlds’ revenue and forecasted their trend from the vendors’ perspective. 
As open-trading virtual worlds gain more popularity, it is interesting to predict revenue from single 
user’s perspective. Virtual goods as advertisements have been widely applied either for real world 
product or as in-world promotion. Featured items on Second Life XStreet are the fixed-fee in-world 
advertisements for virtual items. Whether this benefits virtual goods sales or how to set an optimal 
advertising scheme is worth investigating. Virtual goods have artistic value. Some virtual items may 
have higher value than its real-world archetypes as they are easy to exhibit and not depreciating. The 
optimal quantity of virtual goods design is a question to realize its artistic value in virtual worlds. We 
hope this paper will shed light on users of virtual world and attract potential users to take part in 
virtual goods trading.   
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